Die Polen haben für die Amerikaner foltern lassen und kassierten dafür 18 Mio US$!? Hat es in der JVA Leipzig mit Krankenhaus auch eine Folterzelle der CIA gegeben im Haus II – neben der ehemaligen „Ausländersuite“ !? Ich berichtete über den „Umbau“ im Haftkrankenhaus Meusdorf ! Als ich in der „Ausländersuite“ mit gebrochenem Unterkiefer lag im September 1985 fing man die letzten drei Zellen auf der Stirnseite des Gebäudes mit Stahlgitter vom Rest des Flures abzutrennen.!??) Links neben meiner 5 Mann-Zelle auf 90° war eine 2 Mann Zelle und schräg gegenüber waren die drei SG-Hausarbeiter. Unter der zwei Mann- Zelle auf der Stirnseite erzählte mir einer der Hausarbeiter Dumke, war das „kalte Zimmer“ – wo man Tote-Verstorbene für den Abtransport zwischengelagert hatte.
Eine Abholung durch die Bestater konnte ich von meinem Zellenfesnster im Morgengrauen beobachten.
Jedenfalls als ich meine Gesundheitsakte abholen wollte und die „Ausländersute“ besichtigen wollte, staunte ich nicht schlecht als man uns den Zugang durch den Haupteingang ( Vordereingang) verwehrte und uns um das Gebäude führte.
Ich sah hoch zum Zellenfenster- und der war zugemauert.(!?) Es wurde ein Eingang von der Stirnseite gebaut. Wir gingen die Treppe hoch. Die Treppe endete vor meiner ehemaligen Zellentür- TreppenAufgang endete in meiner „Ausländersuite“
Es gab eine verschlossene Gittertür die in den ehemaligen Flur führte. Weil die 2 Mann Zelle links belegt war konnten wir den Flur nicht betreten. Ich wollte eigentlich sehen was aus der ehemals angefangenen Gitterwand geworden ist, die bei meiner letzten Einlieferung im September 1985 im Bau war. Ich staunte nicht schlecht als ich sah dass rechts neben meiner Zellentür eine durchgemauerte massive Wand stand -ohne Tür !?? Das heißt diese zwei Zellen waren vom Trakt und Flur TOTAL abgeschnitten – die Ärzte hatten keinen direkten Zugang mehr.
Wann und WOZU auch immer dieser Umbau stattgefunden haben soll steht fest: Man hat zwei Zellen für eine besondere Verwendung gebraucht, man scheute keine Kosten für diesen umfangreichen Umbau. Aus der 2 -Mann Zelle wurde ich, nach dem ich am 30.9.1985 meinen Hungerstreik ( 49.8 Kilo) eingestellt hatte am 28.10.1985 Richtung Dresden in Marschgesetzt um in der Nacht zum 29.10.85 in die Tschechei entlassen zu werden (!??)
Den Jenigen armen Schweinen die in diese Zelle verbracht wurden, hätte man die Haut abziehen können, hätte niemand gehört oder gesehen. Sie konnten auch ran- und weggefahren werden ohne dass jemand ausser der am Eingang was davoin mitbekommen hätte. In diesem Sinne berichtete ich das in meinem Blog.
Als ich dann 2010 meine entdeckte und für nicht existent erklärte Gefangenenpersonalakte abholte, bekamen wir als Begleitung den übernommenen Hausmeister Kille.Und als ich die Psychiatrie besuchen wollte, durften wir durch den Haupteingang (!?) Ich hielt vor ehemaligen Ärztezimmer des ChA OSL Hohlfeldt und konnte rechter Hand durch die Gitterwand in den Flur sehen. Am Ende des Flures war die Tür der Zweimanzelle an der linken Wand die Tür zu meiner Ausländersuite( die jetzt in das Treppenhaus führte) – DIE WAND WAR WEG. Ich fragte den Hausmeister staunend!?“Da stand doch bei meinem letzten Besuch doch die Wand !??“ “ Ach die blöde Wand haben wir abgerissen !“ meinte der Hausmeister.
Waren die Polen vertrauenswürdige Partner für die AMIS als Deutsche und konnten den FOLTER-Service ins Geld ummünzen !?? Oder hat diese Umbaumaßnahme damit was zu tun !?? Wenn man möchte könnte man es leicht feststellen!?? Wenn man es möchte !!! Oder wurden die beiden Zellemn für die besondere Verwendung der STASI-Folterknechte benutzt. Eine Folterbank in Beton einzulassen wie im Frauengefängniss Berlin – Köpenick oder Berlin Rummelsburg Haus 6 war im HKH Leipzig Meusdorf nicht möglich.
Standing on Broken Legs
In November 2002, a detainee who had been held partially nude and chained to the floor died, apparently from hypothermia. This case appears similar to the that of Gul Rahman, who died of similarly explained causes at an Afghan site known as the “Salt Pit,” also in November 2002. The site was also called “The Dark Prison”by former captives.
The aide said that the Cobalt site was was dark, like a dungeon, and that experts who visited the site said they’d never seen an American prison where people were kept in such conditions. The facility was so dark in some places that guard had to wear head lamps, while other rooms were flooded with bright lights and white noise to disorient detainees.
At the Cobalt facility, the CIA also forced some detainees who had broken feet or legs to stand in stress-inducing positions, despite having earlier pledged that they wouldn’t subject those wounded individuals to treatment that might exacerbate their injuries.
Starting with Abu Zubaydah, and following with other detainees, the CIA deployed the harshest techniques from the beginning without trying to first elicit information in an “open, non-threatening manner,” the committee found. The torture continued nearly non-stop, for days or weeks at a time.
The CIA instructed personnel at the site that the interrogation of Zubaydah, who’d been shot during his capture, should take “precedence over his medical care,” the committee found, leading to an infection in a bullet wound incurred during his capture. Zubaydah lost his left eye while in custody. The CIA’s instructions also ran contrary to how it told the Justice Department the prisoner would be treated.
The CIA forced some detainees who had broken feet or legs to stand in stress-inducing positions, despite having earlier pledged that they wouldn’t subject those wounded individuals to treatment that might exacerbate their injuries.
Forced Rectal Feeding and Worse
At least five detainees were subjected to “rectal feeding” or “rectal hydration,” without any documented medical need. “While IV infusion is safe and effective,” one officer wrote, rectal hydration could be used as a form of behavior control.
Others were deprived of sleep, which could involve staying awake for as long as 180 hours—sometimes standing, sometimes with their hands shackled above their heads.
Some detainees were forced to walk around naked, or shackled with their hands above their heads. In other instances, naked detainees were hooded and dragged up and down corridors while subject to physical abuse.
At one facility, detainees were kept in total darkness and shackled in cells with loud noise or music, and only a bucket to use for waste.
While the CIA has said publicly that it held about 100 detainees, the committee found that at least 119 people were in the agency’s custody.
“The fact is they lost track and they didn’t really know who they were holding,” the Senate aide said, noting that investigators found emails in which CIA personnel were “surprised” to find some people in their custody. The CIA also determined that at least 26 of its detainees were wrongfully held. Due to the agency’s poor record-keeping, it may never be known precisely how many detainees were held, and how they were treated in custody, the committee found.
No Blockbuster Intelligence
The report will conclude that the CIA’s interrogation techniques never yielded any intelligence about imminent terrorist attacks. Investigators didn’t conclude that no information came from the program at all. Rather, the committee rejects the CIA’s contention that information came from the program that couldn’t have been obtained through other means.
“When you put detainees through these [torture sessions] they will say whatever they can say to get the interrogations to stop,” the Senate aide said.
The Senate Intelligence Committee reviewed 20 cited examples of intelligence “successes” that the CIA identified from the interrogation program and found that there was no relationship between a cited counterterrorism success and the techniques used. Furthermore, the information gleaned during torture sessions merely corroborated information already available to the intelligence community from other sources, including reports, communications intercepts, and information from law-enforcement agencies, the committee found. The CIA had told policymakers and the Department of Justice that the information from torture was unique or “otherwise unavailable.” Such information comes from the “kind of good national-security tradecraft that we rely on to stop terrorist plots at all times,” the Senate aide said.
In developing the enhanced interrogation techniques, the report said, the CIA failed to review the historical use of coercive interrogations. The resulting techniques were described as “discredited coercive interrogation techniques such as those used by torturous regimes during the Cold War to elicit false confessions,” according to the committee. The CIA acknowledged that it never properly reviewed the effectiveness of these techniques, despite the urging of the CIA inspector general, congressional leadership, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
Contractors and Shrinks
The CIA relied on two outside contractors who were psychologists with experience at the Air Force’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape school to help develop, run, and assess the interrogation program. Neither had experience as an interrogator, nor any specialized knowledge of al Qaeda, counterterrorism, or relevant linguistic expertise, the committee found. In 2005, these two psychologists formed a company, and following this the CIA outsourced virtually all aspects of the interrogation program to them. The company was paid more than $80 million by the CIA.
Lies to the President
An internal report by the CIA, known as the Panetta Review, found that there were numerous inaccuracies in the way the agency represented the effectiveness of interrogation techniques—and that the CIA misled the president about this. The CIA’s records also contradict the evidence the agency provided of some “thwarted” terrorist attacks and the capture of suspects, which the CIA linked to the use of these enhanced techniques. The Senate’s report also concludes that there were cases in which White House questions were not answered truthfully or completely.
In the early days of the program, CIA officials briefed the leadership of the House Intelligence Committee. Few records of that session remain, but Senate investigators found a draft summary of the meeting, written by a CIA lawyers, that notes lawmakers “questioned the legality of these techniques.” But the lawyer deleted that line from the final version of the summary. The Senate investigators found that Jose Rodriguez, once the CIA’s top spy and a fierce defender of the interrogation program, made a note on the draft approving of the deletion: “Short and sweet,” Rodriguez wrote of the newly revised summary that failed to mention lawmakers’ concerns about the legality of the program.
Threats to Mothers
CIA officers threatened to harm detainees’ children, sexually abuse their mothers, and “cut [a detainee’s] mother’s throat.” In addition, several detainees were led to believe they would die in custody, with one told he would leave in a coffin-shaped box.
Detainees wouldn’t see their day in court because “we can never let the world know what I have done to you,” one interrogator said.
Sexual Assault by Interrogators
Officers in the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program included individuals who the committee said, “among other things, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.”
“The CIA had a very young person in charge of the facility prior to Aug. 2002. The [CIA] station dropped the ball and somebody froze to death there.”
A Senate aide told reporters, for example, that “enhanced interrogation measures” were applied to detainees with broken limbs, though the CIA had given the committee assurances it wouldn’t do that.
Rodriguez concedes some CIA abuses that were outlined by the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report—including a detainee freezing to death—did occur. But he said such abuses were reported and stopped.
“Interrogation… was not our core skill,” he said. “Mistakes were made,” especially before the official rendition, detention and interrogation program started in Aug. 2002, he said.
“In the months prior to that, when we started taking prisoners [in Afghanistan], we were improvising,” he said.
“The problem we had with Salt Pit,” a detention site in Afghanistan, which the Senate Intelligence report refers to by the code name Cobalt, “is we were to busy chasing al Qaeda and [the] Taliban,” Rodriguez said. “The CIA had a very young person in charge of the facility prior to Aug. 2002. The [CIA] station dropped the ball and somebody froze to death there.”
According to the Senate report, however, that person continued as a manager of the detention site until July 2003, and involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. (He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator only in April 2003.)
The report said the CIA expressed regret for not ultimately punishing him.
The Senate report also suggested waterboarding took place at the Salt Pit when that employee was in charge, before such techniques had been approved by the Justice Department.
“Even though there were all sorts of problems at Salt Pit, I know of no waterboarding,” Rodriguez added, insisting only three people were waterboarded. “It was done after we had received a binding legal opinion from justice and approval from the White House to proceed.”
So what of the photograph of what the Senate report described as a “well-used water board” with buckets around it, at the Salt Pit?
“Nobody reported that to us. I find it hard to believe,” he said. “I know of the waterboarding of the three guys pursuant to the August 2002 program.”
Rodriguez said when he took over the CIA’s CTC in May 2002, he recalled all the interrogators for “retraining” because Saudi al Qaeda suspect Abu Zubaydah had “stopped talking.” The CIA proposed new methods to the Justice Department, which it approved. Abu Zubaydah and two other detainees were subsequently water-boarded, and subjected to other methods including sleep deprivation.
“After August 2002, it was a well managed program with specific instructions with what to do,” Rodriguez insisted. “Nevertheless, there were people who broke the rules. A drill was used to scare someone, smoke [was] blown in someone’s face,” and he said “some detainees were made to stand or kneel in an uncomfortable way.”
He said all the abuses were reported to the CIA’s Inspector General and referred to the Justice Department, which declined to prosecute the employees.
Rodriguez is quoted in the report as cautioning an employee to refrain from using language referring to the “legality” of the interrogation procedures, when he received a cable warning that the Abu Zubaydah interrogation was “approach(ing) the legal limit.”
“Telling employees to stick to authorized legal boundaries is a good thing,” he said Wednesday when asked about the quote. “I probably did it at the request of my lawyers.”
Rodriguez does not equivocate over Feinstein’s charge that interrogation was not critical to finding Bin Laden.
“That’s total bullshit. It’s crap,” he said.
He said information gleaned from a black site interrogation led to the initial focus on that courier who led the U.S. to bin Laden’s compound, outlining in brief the account he wrote in his 2011 book Hard Measures, about the interrogation program.
He said the messenger who went by the name Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti, was first described as a member of bin Laden’s security detail, by a detainee held by the U.S. military.
“Then we heard at a black site that he was Bin Laden’s courier,” during an interrogation of detainee Ammar Al Baluchi—an alleged facilitator of the 9/11 attacks who is now being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
“And then what turned on the lights for me was when Abu Faraj al Libi, who we captured after, said he was informed that he had been elevated to chief of operations through Bin Laden’s courier,” he said.
The clincher for Rodriguez was when CIA officers intercepted a messaged passed by detainee Khalid Sheikh Mohammed “instructing his fellow detainees not to talk about the courier.” He said that’s when CIA officers knew the courier was the man to watch.
“Not the key piece? Okay, perhaps,” Rodriguez concedes. “I think the key piece was getting al-Kuwaiti’s true name, but it was significant.”
He said everyone involved in the program was concerned for their safety because of the report, after years of already undergoing stress for threatened prosecutions.
While he does not believe the Justice Department will revisit prosecuting any employees, he says that there is concern that the report will lead to others’ identifies being exposed.
“Everybody is concerned about having an X on their backs because of it. There are a lot of midlevel people who are scared to death, because they don’t want to be in the public eye,” he said.
And while all he has spoken to still believe the interrogations saved lives, he said the report was a punch in the gut. “They didn’t bargain to be exposed and to be berated for what they did and what they had been told was legal,” he said.
— with additional reporting by Tim Mak and Shane Harris